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INTRODUCTION
The topic of my talk is different from those you have been
dealing with in this conference in one critical aspect-it's one
that all of us are going to confront-we're all going to die. And
death is not a subject anyone can escape because it has both
professional implications-what the law should be, how we
should decide disputes when they arise, and practical ones-how
we should order our own lives, and what we should do to try to
make our death easier if not on ourselves, at least on our loved
ones.
I'm going to discuss the last twenty years of so-called right to
die litigation. Pennsylvania with In re Fiori,' is still trying to
decide where it stands on the right to die. Courts generally have
done a very good job in this area. The only time courts go wrong
is when they view these cases as having something to do with
abortion-and I'm going to argue they have nothing to do with
abortion-or when they look at these cases as disability rights
cases.
We'll see what the major issues are, how they've been dealt
with, where they led to dead ends, how we got to where we are
today and how we might resolve our current confusion.
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1. 652 A.2d 1350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), affd, 1996 Pa. LEXIS 551. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally decided on April 2, 1996, joining the majority
view, that a patient's family can make a substituted judgment decision to remove
life-sustaining medical technology from a previously competent patient. Fiori, 1996
Pa. LEXIS 551. Most of the pre-1994 cases discussed in this talk are dealt with in
much more detail in GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE (1988) and GEORGE J.
ANNAs, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS (1993).
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I. THE RIGHTS OF COMPETENT PATIENTS
The law divides patients into two categories--competent and
incompetent. If you're competent you have a right to refuse any
treatment, for any reason.2 Physicians always needed the
patients' consent to treat, and an unconsented-to medical treat-
ment was historically treated as a battery. More recently the
adjective "informed" has been added to the consent requirement.
Informed consent litigation began in earnest in the 1970's as a
response to medical paternalism. The historic Hippocratic ethic
was paternalistic; doctors know best so doctors get to say what
patients need. Physicians make all the important decisions.
Medical paternalism was rejected in a series of informed consent
cases, and the ethic now is that patients should decide what's to
be done with their body because it is their body. Patients should
have self-determination, and some courts have also talked about
decision making as a privacy interest protected by the U.S. Con-
stitution.
The doctor-patient relationship is an inherently unequal rela-
tionship. The doctor has the power and knowledge, and the
patient is sick and has to trust the doctor. Courts, such as the
California Supreme Court, have termed the doctor-patient rela-
tionship a "fiduciary" or trust relationship; and therefore put
extra obligations on physicians that they wouldn't have if the
doctor-patient relationship was an arm's length business trans-
action.' The theory is-let the patient decide based on informa-
tion about risks, benefits, and alternatives, because the patient
will have to live with the results.
In 1984, in California, in one of the most outrageous incidents
in American medicine and jurisprudence, a competent adult,
William Bartling, was treated against his will for six months.
He was suffering from five fatal illnesses, but none terminal.4
His lung collapsed during a biopsy to determine if he had lung
cancer-he did. Mr. Bartling wanted to be taken off his mechan-
ical ventilator and to leave the hospital. The hospital wouldn't
2. Although courts have mentioned four potentially compelling state interests,
no appellate court has ever ultimately required any competent adult to undergo
treatment for any of those reasons. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
3. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
4. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). See
George J. Annas, Prisoner in the ICU: The Tragedy of William Bartling, 14(6)
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (1984).
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let him refuse treatment, and wouldn't even let him get off the
ventilator-they tied his hands down. Mr. Bartling lived the
last six months of his life in the intensive care unit ("ICU")
where he died while the California courts were still arguing
about his rights. The day after Mr. Bartling died, the California
Court of Appeals ruled that he had the right to refuse treat-
ment. What the hospital did to him, with the slow-acting law's
blessing, was outrageous. Nonetheless, that's the last case I
know of in this country where a competent person was forced by
a judge to endure treatment against his or her will.5
So the law is, and has always been, that competent adults
have the right to refuse any treatment for any reason. Compe-
tent adults don't even have to give a reason-if they give a rea-
son, that's fine, as long as it's not one that makes them look
incompetent. Of course there's an irony here. Most Americans
believe there should be a "right to health care;" instead what
they have is a right to refuse health care.
II. THE RIGHTS OF INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
The legally difficult cases concern incompetent patients, pa-
tients who can't tell you what they want. We're going to look at
decision making for them from medical and legal perspectives.
A. Medical Decisions
Even though we are anti-paternalistic, we know that there
are some decisions that physicians must make; and we let them
make some very specific ones without consulting anybody. The
best example is deciding when a person is dead. We allow doc-
tors to pronounce death as long as they do it on the basis of
accepted criteria. Likewise, in an emergency, I always teach my
medical students to treat first and ask legal questions later. We
don't want doctors discussing the law in the emergency depart-
ment-we want them taking care of people, and they're privi-
leged to do that.
5. The only similar case involved a young woman, Elizabeth Bouvia, para-
lyzed from the neck down, who wanted to starve herself to death. That is a suicide
case rather than a right to die case, but when it came back the second time
through court, she could only eat a little bit and the doctors thought that wasn't
enough. Well, doctors don't have any right to give you more calories than you can
eat even if they think it's best for you, and ultimately the courts agreed with her.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See George J,




Let's review determination of death by brain criteria in some
detail. That was never an issue until heart transplantation was
first used in humans in the late 1960's, and physicians needed
to take a beating heart out of one body and put it into another.
To prevent heart transplantation from involving a single, if not
a double homicide, society needed a definition of death that
permitted physicians to declare someone dead while their heart
was still beating. That turned out to be brain death, and it
makes perfect sense. Robin Cook responded to brain death by
writing Coma,' which upset a lot of people. But coma is not
death-you may never wake up again-but you're not dead.
Brain death is death, but even physicians have a hard time
accepting the notion that someone who is breathing (albeit with
the aid of a ventilator) and has a beating heart, is dead.7
The American Medical Association at first opposed brain
death laws, and others got so stressed that they later demanded
that brain death statutes be passed that granted physicians civil
and criminal immunity for declaring death on brain criteria. In
1981, there were seven different brain death statutes. So theo-
retically (but not really) you could put someone in an ambulance
in California and drive them across the country to Pennsylvania
and they'd be dead, alive, alive, dead, alive, dead, dead, alive,
dead, dead, and arrive in Pennsylvania alive. That's ridiculous.
Our death criteria must be uniform-you can't be dead in one
state and alive in another state. This became recognized by ev-
erybody, through judicial decisions, legislation, and medical
standards. An individual who sustains either irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory and respiratory functions-the old heart lung
definition-or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. That is the law today
and I believe that's been the law for the last twenty years, be-
cause the law still is that you're dead when the doctor says
you're dead (as long as the doctor makes that determination on
the basis of good and accepted medical criteria).8
6. ROBIN COOK, COMA (1977).
7. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court had to state that there is
no legal basis or duty to administer medical treatment after death. See In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980). This observation came as a result of physi-
cians asking whether they had to continue treating a corpse.
8. As Peter McL. Black, a leading neurologist from Massachusetts General
Hospital has put it:
Brain death is not a kind of coma that goes on forever in which a patient
just happens to be on a ventilator to increase their oxygenation or something
like that, it's really a condition in which without the kind of artificial support
that we now in the 20th century can provide, the patient will stop breathing
and the heart will stop. I think it's very important to recognize that when
878 Vol. 34:875
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Some test cases that we have had recently in the courts have
involved anencephalic infants like Baby K.9 An anencephalic
infant has no upper brain. Well, aren't they dead? They are if
they can't breathe. But if they can breathe on their own, they
must have a functioning brain stem, so they're not dead under
existing brain death criteria. They are in very bad shape, and
there is nothing we can do to benefit them. We certainly have
no obligation to treat them. On the other hand, under the law
we can't kill them either because a breathing anencephalic in-
fant is a live person. The wishes of some couples to donate the
organs of their anencephalic children before they die-while
they're still breathing and their heart is still beating-have been
rejected by every court, and properly so.1°
B. Legal Decisions
The most famous "right to die" case still is In re Quinlan"t
from your neighboring jurisdiction of New Jersey, in 1976. Ka-
ren Quinlan was twenty years old at the time she suffered two
periods of not having breathed for fifteen minutes probably from
a mixture of alcohol and drugs. She was rushed to an emergency
room in New Jersey, successfully resuscitated, and put on a
ventilator. Her parents wanted everything done for her, and
continued to want everything for about six months. Finally,
they were persuaded, as the physicians were, that there was no
chance she was ever going to recover, that she was in a persis-
tent vegetative state ("PVS").
My neurologist friend, Dr. Ronald Cranford of the University
of Minnesota, describes this best: "A persistent vegetative state
is different than a coma." A person in a coma has eyes closed
and some reasonable chance of recovering and realizing what's
going on. With persistent vegetative states, people have
sleep/wake cycles, but are not aware of their physical surround-
ings, and never will have any awareness of their physical sur-
brain death criteria are met the patient is dead. It isn't a matter of stopping
the ventilator and then letting the patient die or letting nature take its course
or letting the heart stop. The patient is dead when you say these criteria are
met and the physician says death has occurred. So what you're doing is de-
claring death by brain criteria. That's different than withdrawing support for
other reasons. That's declaring death.
9. See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). See also George J. Annas,
Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care: The Case of Baby K, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542 (1994).
10. E.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
11. 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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roundings. As Dr. Cranford puts it, 'They are awake, but un-
aware." Because PVS patients have sleep/wake cycles, there
have been many cases in the courts where loved ones and nurses
have sworn that the patient looked at them or responded to
them.
People in persistent vegetative states have commonly been the
subject of court hearings, and almost all of the important right
to die cases turn out to involve patients in persistent vegetative
states. A practical reason for this is that most critically ill pa-
tients, no matter what you do to them, either recover or die in a
short period of time. If judges delay the case long enough, the
terminally ill patient will usually die and the judge won't have
to decide the case. Trial court judges hate to make "life or
death" decisions. But persistent vegetative state patients can
live for decades, and often do. That's what makes these cases so
hard for families; but it also means that judges can't avoid de-
ciding them by simply waiting for nature to take its course.
Karen's case became known under the slogan "right to die,"
even though the case did not involve this "right." It was a right
to refuse medical treatment case. It's not as if we have any
choice in the matter whether or not we'll die. It's a right most of
us would choose not to exercise if we did have the choice, but we
don't, we're all going to die. The question is whether, when we're
dying, we have an obligation to accept all the wonderful things
that modern medicine has to offer, to agree to submit to whatev-
er can be done medically to postpone death.
That was one of the questions in Quinlan: did Karen have a
legal obligation to stay on the ventilator if that's the only thing
that's keeping her alive? Well, unless we want to make medical
technology our master, the answer has to be no. The doctors
who had originally tried to get the Quinlans to agree to take
Karen off the ventilator knew this. Nonetheless, because the
case seemed unprecedented, they consulted their lawyers. The
lawyers told them they thought ventilator removal was fine, but
just to be sure, they said they would feel better if the Quinlans
went to court to get the doctors prospective legal immunity for
any kind of liability, criminal or civil, before they removed the
ventilator. That was bad legal advice, although the Quinlans felt
they had no choice. The case did go to court, and a lower court
judge heard incredible testimony from the very physicians who
had wanted to remove the ventilator. The physicians testified
that it was against medical ethics to take Karen off the ventila-
tor.
The case was immediately appealed to the New Jersey Su-
preme Court. Governor Richard Hughes was the Chief Justice,
880 Vol. 34:875
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and thought this case of first impression should be decided
quickly to help the Quinlan family. He did decide it quickly
(within four months of the trial judge's decision) for a unani-
mous bench, ruling that Karen had a constitutional right to
refuse treatment based on the then-recent abortion decision Roe
v. Wade."2 The court said that Karen didn't lose her right to
refuse treatment by becoming incompetent, and that her parents
could exercise it on her behalf, based on what they thought she
would want done.
Virtually every subsequent court has followed Judge Hughes
in those findings, but the New Jersey court went further than
that. It asked, in effect: "What are we going to do with the doc-
tors who testified at trial that it's against medical ethics to take
Karen off the ventilator?" The court was stuck with that testi-
mony, so what it did with it was very interesting-Chief Justice
Hughes said: Well, we know these are honorable doctors and we
believe what they say about medical ethics. But obviously their
perception of liability influences them a lot in terms of how they
articulate the medical profession's ethical standards. They're
really worried (and should be worried) about legal liability,
about whether they'll get sued. Nonetheless, I think that if they
took these physicians into a soundproof room and asked them
what they thought the right thing to do was, they'd say "turn
the ventilator off."
Because the New Jersey Supreme Court believed that doctors
adopted their ventilator discontinuance standards based on their
worry about lawyers and liability, and because the court wanted
doctors to do good, the court set up a mechanism to provide
doctors with immunity from criminal and civil liability. The
court did this by granting an ethics committee the authority to
provide legal immunity to physicians and others, at least in
cases where the patient has no reasonable possibility of return-
ing to a "cognitive sapient state"--i.e., the patient is in a persis-
tent vegetative state. If the ethics committee agrees, the doctors
can stop treatment, and everybody will be immune from liabili-
ty. That's New Jersey's solution-to grant physicians inmuni-
ty.1
Quinlan did not energize ethics committees--although ethics
12. 410 U.S. 113, rehg denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
13. Since the New Jersey ethics committee only deals with medical prognosis,
it was quickly renamed a "prognosis committee" and its membership limited to
neurosurgeons and neurologists. Karen herself lived another nine years in a PVS




committees were set up many places-but did energize the living
will movement in the United States. The problem that a lot of
people had, including the courts, with Karen was that she had
never said clearly what she'd want done if she was in a persis-
tent vegetative state. Not until Quinlan did most people say to
their loved ones something like "I'd never want to be like Karen
Ann Quinlan." Most people have said that, and many people
have actually signed forms to this effect as well. Almost all
states passed statutes in the wake of Quinlan to encourage
citizens to sign living wills (documents which are "living" be-
cause they take effect while you're still alive, and which are
wills in the sense that they say what you would want after
you're no longer able to say it yourself).
There were at least eighty-four appellate cases on the "right to
die" decided in the United States before the case of Nancy
Cruzan got to the United States Supreme Court in 1990." Nan-
cy Cruzan was a young woman in exactly the same condition as
Karen Quinlan, except all she needed was a feeding tube to
continue to live. She was in a persistent vegetative state caused
by an automobile accident. There was no hope for her to ever
recover, and her parents ultimately asked that the tube feeding
be removed. Unlike almost every other case, the lower court
judge in this case, Judge Teel, agreed with the parents that
Nancy would not want to be tube fed in her persistent vegetative
state. "
The Attorney General of Missouri, however, decided to appeal
the case. He said that if the right to refuse treatment really is
based on informed consent, he wanted an informed refusal. He
wanted evidence that while she was alive, Nancy Cruzan said
something like, "If I'm ever like Karen Quinlan, I don't want
tube feeding even though I know that I'll die without it." The
Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General, and
held that the State of Missouri had the constitutional authority
to require clear and convincing evidence of an individual's per-
sonal decision before life sustaining treatment is removed, and
to refuse to let family members make a proxy decision for an
incompetent person. 6 The Cruzans appealed to the United
14. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15. Trial court judges have a terrible time deciding cases in this area when
the patient is still alive, because the judges feel like they're being asked to end the
patient's life. What they're really being asked to do is vindicate the patient's right to
make their own decision, or in some cases where the patient hasn't spoken, the
family's decision on the patient's behalf.
16. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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States Supreme Court, and to date it's the only "right to die"
case, again, more properly labelled a right to refuse treatment
case, that the Court has decided. In a five-to-four decision, with
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Antonin Scalia writing
separate concurring opinions, the Supreme Court affirmed, rul-
ing that Missouri had the constitutional authority to require
clear and convincing evidence that the individual personally
made the treatment refusal decision. And that's bad, because
people don't leave such specific instructions, and loving families
are the best surrogate decision makers. Nonetheless, there are
some good things that came out of that case.
One good thing was resolving the question of whether fluids
and nutrition delivered through nasal gastric tubes or gastrosto-
my tubes should be treated like all other medical treatment
(especially like ventilators). All nine Justices treated them the
same; fluids and nutrition artificially delivered are the same as
other medical treatment. Certainly there's no constitutional
distinction. If Americans have the right to refuse one we have
the right to refuse them all, and we know already that we have
the right to refuse them all.
Second, in dicta, a majority of the Justices said they believed
that competent people have the constitutional right to refuse
any treatment, including artificially-delivered fluids and nutri-
tion. Another ray of hope in this case is Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion, where she said requiring clear and convinc-
ing evidence is not realistic.17 It's not realistic to think that
twenty-year-old women or men are going to think about how
they're going to die and plot what things doctors might have
available to postpone their deaths. Justice O'Connor said essen-
tially that she believed that if Nancy had just said something
like "If I'm ever not able to make medical decisions for myself, I
want my mother to make them," that would have been a consti-
tutionally-protected delegation of authority. Put another way,
that statement would have been clear and convincing evidence
that Nancy wanted her mother to make those decisions, and her
mother would then have had the legal authority to make them.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion energized the health care
proxy movement in this country. Obviously we don't have the
entire court saying that such a delegation of authority is consti-
tutionally-protected, but I think we have at least seven members
of the Court who would agree with that.I"
17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. See generally George J. Annas, The Long Dying of Nancy Cruzan, 19 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 52 (1991).
1996
Duquesne Law Review
After the opinion, the Cruzans went back to Judge Teel and
three of Nancy's friends testified that she had told them that if
she was ever like Karen Ann Quinlan, she didn't want to be
tube fed. Judge Teel found that this testimony constituted clear
and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes. The Attorney Gen-
eral had by that time figured out that he was on the wrong side
of this issue (he wanted to run for governor), so he did not ap-
peal. Nancy died on December 26, 1990, shortly after her feeding
tube was removed.
Cruzan is obviously the most important case ever decided on
this issue because it's the only Supreme Court opinion. But it is
a very unsatisfactory one. In addition to accepting a burden-
some standard of proof which is more likely to frustrate rather
than further autonomy, only Justice John Paul Stevens dis-
cussed the alternative best interests standard. How should this
work for PVS patients? How do you figure out what's in the
best interest of someone like Nancy Cruzan?
Some courts have talked about burdens and benefits, but
someone in a persistent vegetative state has neither burdens nor
benefits. There is no awareness-you can't help them, you can
keep them alive-but you can't make them better. You probably
can't hurt them either, because they have no awareness of pain
or suffering. Justice Rehnquist states in Cruzan that we should
err on the side of life and maintain the status quo by doing
that. 9 Justice William Brennan thought that in general that's
right. In an emergency, doctors should treat first and ask legal
questions later. If life has a side, that's an easy choice, if it's life
or death. But Justice Brennan noted that in Cruzan it is not
life or death, it's a choice of death and death." So when you're
not in that kind of a situation where the "life or death" slogan
doesn't make sense, what do you do? This is the question.
The question is important because if you make a best interest
determination for one person in a PVS, you make it for every-
body, because everybody in a persistent vegetative state has
exactly the same "best interest" (since we're making this deter-
mination objectively). No one in a PVS will wake up, so none of
them can be burdened or benefitted. This is an issue that our
society is not willing to face right now, but for good or evil the
insurance companies and health plans will face it; and they will
not pay. Within the next few years, you'll see health plans pay-
ing for a limited number of days of institutional care for people
19. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
20. Id. at 316-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in persistent vegetative states, and after that the family is on its
own. The family can pay privately, but private insurance won't
cover it anymore. I think courts will uphold those types of re-
strictions if they are put in the contract, because such limita-
tions are not against public policy. It's also probably the only
way we're going to solve this "PVS problem," because doctors
and lawyers aren't going to do it.
Another strand that runs through these cases is that courts
don't want to make the decisions themselves. But they also don't
quite trust the families-they almost trust the families, but not
quite. Quinlan set up an ethics committee which was quickly
recognized by the New Jersey Attorney General for what it
was-a prognosis committee-and it's been replaced by two
neurosurgeons or a neurologist and a neurosurgeon to confirm
that someone really is in a persistent vegetative state. The Fiori
case in Pennsylvania does the same thing, it says that we don't
want a judge to make these decisions. You don't have to come to
court and that's right, but it does require that the family get two
independent neurologists to confirm the diagnosis of persistent
vegetative state. I don't know how you enforce that requirement,
and I don't know what that means, but I understand the dis-
comfort of just letting families say what should be done.
Judges would really appreciate it if people would fill out living
will forms. Tell us what you want done, or better yet, appoint
someone as your health care proxy to make decisions for you. It
is better to delegate the authority to make decisions to another
person because it gives the doctor somebody to talk to. Forms
are always susceptible to interpretation and misinterpretation,
and doctors are uncomfortable with making decisions on the
basis of a form. It's much better for you, for them, and for every-
body, if doctors have someone to talk to. And not just someone
like the next of kin who traditionally, by custom, has legal au-
thority to make decisions, but a healthcare proxy who, by stat-
ute, and court decisions, has the same legal authority to make
the decisions you would have made yourself. The current trend
is state legislation that designates a proxy for you if you haven't
done it yourself, and this makes perfect -sense.
C. The Baby Doe Regulations: The Discrimination Model
This still leaves some people who have never been able to
make any decisions, who could never tell us what they want or
who they want to make decisions for them, like newborns and
young children. We've had fifteen years of controversies about
how to make decisions with handicapped newborns in this coun-
1996
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try, dating back to the beginning of the Reagan administra-
tion-the Baby Doe regulations. In 1982 the federal government
required every hospital to post signs in the delivery rooms, the
neo-natal intensive care units, and the pediatric ward, that any
person having knowledge of a handicapped infant being
discriminatorily denied accustomed medical care should contact
this Baby Doe hotline in Washington and investigators would
come out and investigate. This lasted for about eight months.
In the more than 100 cases that were investigated, they were
able to find no case of any infant in the United States who was
discriminatorily being denied food or customary medical care."
Not that it doesn't happen, but this mechanism did not find it.
What was found was that many infants get more care than they
should; that it's virtually impossible to get physicians in neo-
natal ICU's to stop aggressively treating handicapped newborns
until they die. Discrimination was not a general problem, but it
was a problem for kids with Down syndrome. The original
Baby Doe was a child with Down syndrome whose tracheole-
sphogal fistula (a hole between the trachea and the esophagus
that made it impossible to feed the child), was not repaired be-
cause of the child's retardation. That was clearly wrong. If that
was acceptable medical behavior twenty years ago, it's not any-
more. But outside of that, most physicians follow the rules
related to child neglect and child abuse, and provide medically-
indicated, customary care.
Courts have used all five of the following phrases (they're all
basically the same) to describe the legal duty of physicians:
physicians must provide customary medical care, beneficial
treatment, reasonable medical care, care which in their reason-
able medical judgment is indicated, and appropriate treatment
to children because we assume that they want to live rather
than die. The problem often is that there is no customary stan-
dard of care nor accepted medical treatment. There is no routine
way to separate Siamese twins or determine how extremely
premature newborns should be treated. The quest to get a small-
er and smaller baby to live is a giant experiment, and there are
no real standard treatments to take care of most of these very
young, underdeveloped neonates. It's not a matter that physi-
cians are trying to discriminate against the handicapped; they're
trying to figure out how to treat them. And yes, some neonates
are treated differently than others-but not because of race or
21. GFORGE J. ANNAS & SHERMAN ELIAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE
LAW 168-94 (1987).
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creed, but because their different medical conditions require
different treatments. The whole notion that there is a massive
campaign to discriminate against handicapped children or hand-
icapped adults is just wrong; there is no evidence to support it.
On the other hand, we have an extraordinarily high standard
for stopping treatment on a newborn or a child. It's the best
interest standard translated by the courts as "better off dead."
You really can't stop treating a child until you can make a credi-
ble argument that the child is better off dead than alive. It's
kind of a restatement of the err on the side of life logic, only in a
context where the available medical technology is almost over-
whelming. We probably need a more nuanced standard. We
should always give kids the benefit of the doubt as long as there
really is some doubt. But we shouldn't insist on 100% certainty
before we call off the intensive care unit.
D. The Role of the Family and Futility
What should the role of the family be in decision making for
incompetent patients? We can begin to answer this question by
looking at the case of Helga Wanglie," perhaps the best known
futility case. Mrs. Wanglie was an older woman in a persistent
vegetative state. Her husband, a leading attorney in Minnesota,
insisted that everything be done for her-a ventilator and tube
feeding-hoping for a miracle. The doctors, for the first time in
the United States, tried to make an argument in court that it
was wrong to treat someone in a persistent vegetative state once
the diagnosis was certain. They argued that treatment was
futile, unnecessary, non-beneficial, and doctors shouldn't do it. It
was a very difficult argument to make when we know that at
least 10,000 people are now being treated that way in the Unit-
ed States. Doctors do it-it's currently medically customary
treatment.
The question is how to change medical custom. If courts won't
say people in persistent vegetative states are better off dead
(based on a best interests analysis), and the legislatures won't
say it, and up until now the insurance companies haven't said it,
can the doctors say it? The answer is that doctors should say it
and say it through their professional associations. They haven't
been able to say it yet, they won't say it, for all kinds of reasons,
but some doctors at least are trying. The Minnesota physicians
went to court on a guardianship petition, and asked that Mr.




Wanglie be removed as guardian on the basis that he wasn't
acting in the best interests of his wife. The petition was de-
nied-end of story. The court never got to the discontinuance of
treatment issue. Mrs. Wanglie died shortly thereafter.
A case in Massachusetts, involving a patient named Catherine
Gilgunn,2 which is currently on appeal, is another famous fu-
tility case. It involves an elderly woman who was in an ICU at
the Massachusetts General Hospital. This woman spent the last
sixty days of her life in and out of an ICU, being vigorously
cared for. Her daughter refused to agree to a do not resuscitate
("DNR") order. The doctors, with the chair of the ethics commit-
tee, and everybody else involved on board except the daughter,
did write a DNR order because they believed it was impossible
to resuscitate her anyway, i.e., it would be futile. The mother
died, and the daughter sued. It is a very bizarre case, because
she sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress on her by
not resuscitating her mother.
The judge asked the jury to decide whether the mother would
have wanted to be resuscitated, and whether the doctors were
correct in not resuscitating her. The jury found first that the
mother would have wanted to be resuscitated. But second, the
jury found that the doctors were right not to resuscitate her.
What's going on here? I think the jury came to exactly the right
decision, because there was nothing that could possibly be done
for the woman. On the other hand, many physicians have over-
interpreted this case, saying it means they can now do whatever
they want, that they can decide when treatment is futile, and it
doesn't matter if patients want to be treated or not, if the doc-
tors say they shouldn't be treated-you can't. This illustrates the
danger of the futility issue: it can bring us back to medical pa-
ternalism which is where we started.
But mostly we have the answer--competent adults can refuse
any treatment for any reason. The government never has more
interest in your life than you have in it yourself, so the govern-
ment can't force you to be treated. With incompetent people, doc-
tors can make some decisions, whether you're dead, hopeless, or
need emergency treatment. Courts have been open to declarato-
ry judgments, and in some cases courts have granted physicians
prospective immunity against homicide and negligence.
Most of the debate now is about the issues of substituted judg-
ment and best interests. For substituted judgment we try to get
23. M. Mulvihill, MGH Faces Suit in Mom's Death, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 4,
1995, at 1.
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people to sign forms and tell their relatives what they want, and
to appoint someone else to make decisions for them. For best
interests, we still have a hard time when someone hasn't told us
what they want done, and we usually decide that it's best for
them not to be dead, at least for children.
Death obviously is very hard for us to face. With persistent
vegetative states and other diseases that result in severe brain
damage, you're not dead. Nonetheless, you're in such bad shape
that we know by surveys that 90% of Americans would not want
continued medical treatment in a PVS. The presumption in
these cases should be changed. It's wrong to continue the pre-
sumption in favor of continued treatment in someone in a persis-
tent vegetative state when we have overwhelming evidence that
Americans don't want to continue to live like that.
III. SUICIDE
I'm going to spend the remainder of my time on current
events-suicide and active euthanasia-which are very hot top-
ics in the courts now. We're going to look at cases in the Ninth
Circuit" and the Second Circuit 5 on suicide. The issue is
whether Washington and New York laws against assisted sui-
cide are constitutional as applied to physicians writing lethal
prescriptions for their competent, terminally ill patients. The
Second Circuit decided that these laws deny equal protection to
people who unlike Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan don't have
any medical intervention to refuse. The Second Circuit rightly
noted that you have the right to refuse a ventilator, even if the
result is death. But what if you don't need a ventilator? Shou-
ldn't you have the right to get some help from a doctor in dying
then too, and isn't that denial of equal protection when the doc-
tor can't help you die but he can help someone who needs medi-
cal intervention to continue to live? Of course this line of rea-
soning only makes any sense if you have reconfigured the right
to refuse treatment not just to a "right to die," but to a "right to
hasten death" with a physician's assistance.
The Ninth Circuit's eight-to-three en banc opinion follows an
earlier one by a three judge panel about six months ago, and I'll
discuss it soon. Another case before the Ninth Circuit, which
they haven't decided yet, is Oregon's new initiative ("Ballot Mea-
sure 16") which gives physicians legal immunity for prescribing
24. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3944 (9th
Cir. 1996).
25. See Quill v. Vacco, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6215 (2d Cir. 1996).
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lethal drugs to terminally ill patients if, among other things, the
patients ask for those drugs three times in a row over a fourteen
day period.2" The district court judge in Oregon also used a
superficial discrimination argument based on an equal protec-
tion analysis. He said that Ballot Measure 16 denies equal pro-
tection to people who are terminally ill, essentially because it
doesn't permit physicians to prescribe lethal drugs to
nonterminal people. Therefore, by carving out this category of
people with less than six months to live, we're devaluing their
lives by giving doctors immunity for helping them die. Again,
that's a handicap-discrimination analysis, which I think is
wrong for the same reason the Baby Doe strategy was wrong.
Nonetheless, there are other substantial problems with the Ore-
gon statute.7
The physician-assisted suicide movement began in the U.S.
when Derek Humphrey came here from England. He left En-
gland because he thought he was going to be prosecuted for
giving his first wife a lethal overdose of drugs when she was
dying of breast cancer. He came to the United States and start-
ed the Hemlock Society to try to get what he had done legalized.
A couple of years ago he wrote Final Exit28 which was a best-
seller on the New York Times "do it yourself' list for a long time,
showing that Americans are actually quite interested in this.
Americans don't trust doctors to take good care of them when
they're in extremis, and mostly they're right about that. Doctors
have a terrible reputation in this country regarding how they
take care of terminally ill patients. They treat them aggressive-
ly, but don't medicate them sufficiently for pain, and ultimately
abandon them.
When you ask people, "how would you like to die?" most peo-
ple say they'd like to die quickly, in their sleep, at home sur-
rounded by loved ones and out of pain. But almost all Americans
die in the hospital surrounded by strangers, in pain and in terri-
ble shape. So we have a big cultural lag with the way we take
care of dying patients and the way they want to be taken care
of. Humphrey tapped into this American malaise-the way we
fail to take care of our dying. What Derek Humphrey recom-
mends is that just after you take the drugs, you put a plastic
bag over your head and tie it tight, so that if the drugs don't kill
you, you'll suffocate to death.
26. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Ore. 1995).
27. See George J. Annas, Death by Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1240 (1994).
28. DEREK HUMPHREY, FINAL ExIT (1991).
Vol. 34:875
Science and the Law
Jack Kevorkian thinks that's too horrible, so he invented-he
is an inventor and a pathologist who actually never had a live
patient in his life-the "suicide machine." He puts an IV in your
arm, then you turn on the IV to deliver saline. You automatical-
ly get an anesthetic, and then you finally get a death-producing
drug-potassium chloride. The theory is that he doesn't kill
you-you kill yourself. Kevorkian has been charged with homi-
cide a number of times in Michigan and he has had some of his
cases dismissed, and he actually was found not guilty by juries
in two cases. The Michigan Supreme Court recently sent back
two other cases to be tried for assisted suicide rather than homi-
cide.2'
Kevorkian's first "patient" was Janet Adkins, who came to
Michigan from Oregon after she saw him on the Donahue show.
She had early Alzheimer disease. She was in pretty good shape,
but she knew that some time in the future she would not be in
such good shape, and she wanted to die while she was still able
to make a decision herself. She had seen people with Alzheimer
disease who were unable to recognize anyone, who didn't know
where they were, and she said she'd rather be dead than be in
that shape. I think most of us might say that too. On the other
hand, what we'd also likely say is what we'd like to do is die the
day we get that way, but not a day before, certainly not years
before, the way she did. But again, she didn't trust anybody, so
she came to Kevorkian. After this first case, Kevorkian was
unable to insert an IV, so he switched to the carbon monoxide
machine, which he's used ever since. Carbon monoxide, of
course, is not a controlled substance or a medical drug; many
people use that method of suicide with their automobile in their
garage.
I don't know what you think of Kevorkian, but I've called him
a serial killer. Medical ethicist Arthur Caplan calls him a serial
mercy killer, and I guess that's nicer. But whatever you think of
him and his machines, they are not a medical means, and he's
not acting like a doctor when he does this. Nonetheless, he does
get a lot of credit for having been a doctor, and the fact that he
once was a licensed doctor, rather than a plumber or an elec-
trician, is why he's still on the streets today in Michigan, and
why he still has a lot of support in this country. Even people
who don't think they would ever use Kevorkian think he should
be available because in America we don't want to limit our
29. State v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995). See Kevorkian Faces Suicide Prosecution Without a Law Being Cited,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1996, at A20.
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"choice," even our choice of how to die. That says pretty horrible
things about the state of American medicine today, and how we
fail to care for dying people.
I also think it's worth at least mentioning that virtually every
case, including Kevorkian's first eight cases, involved men kill-
ing women, or assisting them to die. Derek Humphrey was
involved in the deaths of his first two wives, one directly and
one indirectly. Kevorkian's first eight victim-patients were wom-
en (when he got a lot of grief that he was just killing women, he
started with men). Dr. Timothy Quill's patient was Diane, and
we have Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan. Virtually all of
these cases involve men making decisions about how women will
die. There's a heavy-duty feminist analysis we could do with this
whole assisted death movement too, but for today let's just note
that the most famous physician in the world is Jack Kevorkian,
a man who made his reputation helping to kill women.
In the past the distinction of being the world's most famous
physician has gone to doctors like Christian Barnard, who per-
formed the world's first heart transplant, and William DeVries,
who implanted the world's first artificial heart--doctors trying to
keep people alive rather than make people dead. And that's a
major change, a major cultural change, in the way we look at
medicine. I'm not saying we want doctors to kill us now and we
wanted them to keep us alive before, but we're much more am-
bivalent about the role of physicians in society today than we've
been in the past. Maybe we really have become what the Pope
has described as a "culture of death."
The debate over the legality of physician-assisted suicide dra-
matically moved to a discussion of constitutional issues with the
two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions previously men-
tioned. In both cases, physicians and their terminally ill cancer
and AIDS patients brought suit asking that the laws against
assisted suicide be declared unconstitutional as applied to
them.3"
The Ninth Circuit adopted the term "physician-assisted sui-
cide" to describe "the prescription of life ending medication for
30. In the Ninth Circuit, four physicians and three patients (one dying of
AIDS, one of cancer, and another of emphysema) challenged a Washington law that
prohibits aiding another to commit suicide. In the Second Circuit, three physicians
and three patients (two dying of AIDS and one of cancer) challenged New York laws
that prohibit aiding another to commit or to attempt suicide. None of these pa-
tients was currently suicidal, but all wanted drugs available so that they could take
them at some time in the future if their suffering became unbearable. All the phy-
sicians said that they felt unable to comply with the requests of these patients be-
cause of these laws against assisted suicide (there are no laws against suicide).
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use by terminally ill, competent adult patients who wish to has-
ten their deaths," but was not happy with it, saying "we have
serious doubts that the terms 'suicide' and 'assisted suicide' are
appropriate legal descriptions of the specified conduct at issue
here." Instead of ruling simply that the assisted suicide laws do
not apply to such prescriptions, however, the court reco-
nceptualized previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions to find a
new constitutional right in the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment, the right "to determine the time and manner of
one's death." To do this it made the common mistake of adopt-
ing the abortion analogy, and quoted Casey: "These matters,
[contraception, procreation, marriage, and child rearing] involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."31  Again referring to Casey, the court concluded that
"like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the
decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy."'
The other major case the Ninth Circuit relied on is Cruzan,
which as we have seen upholds a liberty interest in "refusing
unwanted medical treatment," but which the court
reconceptualized as having "necessarily recognize[d] a liberty
interest in hastening one's own death." Most centrally, the
Ninth Circuit refused to distinguish the right to refuse treat-
ment from the right to demand assistance in suicide. It did this
because the Ninth Circuit believed in Cruzan (where the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to permit a feeding tube to be removed
from Nancy Cruzan) that the Court nonetheless sanctioned "sui-
cide by starvation." It thus uncritically adopted the political
"right to die" slogan as a statement of law. The Ninth Circuit
also rejected the principle of the double effect, alleging that
physicians who remove feeding tubes and respirators always do
so with the explicit and single intent that the patient die-and
not to honor the patient's right to refuse treatment."
31. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 503 U.S. 933 (1992).
32. The language in the 1992 Casey opinion is broad, but it is much narrower
than the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, since it reduces the abortion decision from a
fundamental right to a protected liberty interest. Moreover, 'rhese matters," which
the operative quote from Casey refer to all relate to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, child rearing and education-not suicide. The Court re-
fused to expand these rights even to encompass consensual sodomy in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and Casey itself applies only to abortion, a medical
procedure that has long been recognized as sui generis.
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The Second Circuit summarily rejected the substantive due
process analysis of the Ninth Circuit, concluding simply: "The
right to assisted suicide finds no cognizable basis in the
Constitution's language or design, even in the very limited cases
of those competent persons who, in the final stages of terminal
illness, seek the right to hasten death." But, as previously noted,
the Second Circuit did find a right to a doctor's prescription
based on the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
While this is superficially a different approach than the Ninth
Circuit's, in fact the Second Circuit also had to invent a new
right before it could conclude that the right was being granted
unequally by the state. It did so by concluding that the right to
refuse treatment is actually the same as the right to "hasten
death;" and that there is no distinction between a terminally ill
person on life-support equipment and one who is not. Neither
conclusion is tenable, but the court accepted both almost without
analysis. As to the first, the Second Circuit concluded that New
York treats similarly situated people unequally because its law
permits individuals "in the final stages of terminal illness who
are on life support systems.. . to hasten their deaths by direct-
ing the removal of such systems," but those not so attached
cannot hasten their death "by self-administering prescription
drugs."
The primary cases the Second Circuit cited for this proposition
are Cruzan and In re Eichner,3 even though neither patient in
these two persistent vegetative states cases was terminally ill,
and neither had expressed any desire to commit suicide. Indeed,
it is likely that Brother Fox, a Catholic brother (whose confessor
was Fr. Eichner), would have been horrified at the notion that
his refusal of a ventilator was suicide. As Cruzan makes clear,
the right at stake is the right to refuse treatment (even if this
results in death), not the right to commit suicide with assis-
tance. Nor is there any requirement that a person be either
Reliance on Cruzan is equally misplaced. The Ninth Circuit opinion reads
as if the Cruzans had prevailed, but they did not. The State of Missouri was per-
mitted by the Court to keep Nancy Cruzan on a feeding tube and in her persistent
vegetative state even in the face of uncontradicted evidence that she would not have
wanted it. By permitting Missouri to "require clear and convincing evidence" of
Nancy's personal wishes, the Court permitted Missouri to deny Nancy Cruzan's
rights as a practical matter on the basis that Missouri could simply declare an "un-
qualified interest in life." Moreover, neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the
U.S. Supreme Court saw a refusal of artificial fluids and nutrition by Nancy or her
parents as a possible violation of Missouri's law against assisted suicide. Far from
supporting the Ninth Circuit opinion, both Casey and Cruzan undercut it.
33. 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981). See George J. Annas, Help from the Dead,- The
Cases of Brother Fox and John Storar, 11(3) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19 (1981).
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terminally ill or in pain to exercise this right. Americans have
never been obligated to accept any or all manner of medical
treatment to prolong life: patients have the right to decide, med-
ical technologies do not have the right to be used. As we have
seen, the right at stake is the right to be free from unwanted
bodily invasions.
Even more glaring, however, was the Second Circuit's belief
that removal of artificially-delivered fluids and nutrition causes
"death by starvation... or dehydration." In the court's remark-
able words: "The ending of life by these means is nothing more
nor less than assisted suicide." Here the court applies the philo-
sophical argument that all things being equal there is no moral
distinction between an act or an omission to act (true in trials of
therapy) to a situation where all things are not equal-especial-
ly duty, consent, and intent. Because it considered both treat-
ment refusals and taking lethal drugs as suicide, the court be-
lieved that the state must treat them both the same.
The patients presented to these two court cases are all sym-
pathetic, and it is not surprising that these courts wanted to
help them. What is surprising is that these courts failed to
explicitly acknowledge that there has never been anything ille-
gal in prescribing pain medication that a competent terminally
ill patient may use to commit suicide, as long as the physicians'
intent is to foster the patient's well-being by giving the patient
more control over their life, and the drug has an independent
legitimate medical use.' Such conduct is not assisted suicide,
but is simply good medical care in appropriate cases, most of
which will involve cancer and AIDS. This is all that the six
patients in these two cases wanted, and what Dr. Timothy Quill,
the lead plaintiff in the Second Circuit case, has already openly
done and had legally and medically approved in New York.
Specifically, he prescribed lethal drugs to his terminally-ill can-
cer patient, Diane, who later used them to commit suicide."
Neither court could point to even one case of a physician ever
being prosecuted for the conduct they approve of, and both
courts would have been on much stronger ground by simply
acknowledging that intent matters in criminal law, and that
causation is a matter of public policy such that prescriptions
under these circumstances are not assisted suicide by definition.
It is no more assisted suicide to take the risk that your patient
might commit suicide than it is attempted homicide to risk your
34. Annas, supra note 27.
35. T.E. Quill, Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision Making,
334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
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patient's life on the operating table.
Related to this, it is impossible to accept either court's logic
regarding the cause of death from treatment refusals. If one
accepts that Nancy Cruzan "died of starvation" and not of her
condition that made continued artificial feeding necessary for
her survival, one would also have to accept the conclusion that
when physicians stop cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") on
a patient in cardiac arrest, the patient dies not from the arrest,
but rather the physician kills the patient by intentionally stop-
ping the heart beat. Since failure to perform CPR always "has-
tens death," under each court's analysis, patients who refuse
CPR would always be committing suicide (and doctors who write
DNR orders would always be assisting this suicide). The failure
to distinguish real causes of death from the existence of various
medical tools and techniques that may temporarily substitute for
particular bodily functions is a fatal one to the logic of both
these opinions. Since the vast majority of deaths in hospitals
occur after some medical intervention is refused or deemed use-
less, under the court's logic there is an epidemic of suicide and
homicide in the nation's hospitals-a patently absurd conclu-
sion."
36. Almost the only good news I see on the horizon is that Americans don't
actually want everything at the end of life. They do want experimental drugs, artifi-
cial hearts, whatever's available. But one thing so far they haven't demanded is to
be cryogenically preserved-have their bodies preserved and hope that some day in
the future, aliens from outer space, or even some scientists in the United States,
can figure out how to thaw them out and let then live again.
One of the more interesting cases, even though it's always been talked about
as just being a bizarre case, is a case in California of a gentleman who was dying
of a brain tumor-a fast-growing astrocytoma. He had done a lot of research on his
brain tumor and did research on cryogenic preservation, and he had four or five
weeks to live. And here's what he said to the judge: "Look, judge, I'm dying, no
question about it, and I'm going to be dead in a month, no question about that
either. I want my brain cryogenically preserved because I think someday they're
going to be able to figure out how to treat my tumor. Nobody knows the answer to
that, it's speculative, but I'm not so dumb as the rest of these people who go to
Alcor and have their brain frozen after they're dead, I know there's no resurrection.
Once your brain is dead, you're dead. I want my brain frozen before I die while Im
still alive. Then I'll at least have a chance to live in the future.' What's wrong with
that? Assume the guy is competent, he studied this, he knows every treatment
known to man, and he is definitely going to die of this brain tumor and now he's
asking you for his final request. Usually people's final request is either to take them
off the ventilator or give them an experimental treatment. His final request was let
someone freeze his brain so he could be brought back to life when a cure was dis-
covered. I think this is just another way to talk about homicide, that this is just
killing him and freezing his brain. Nonetheless, this should certainly be permissible
under the assisted suicide decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuits. See Donaldson
v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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CONCLUSION
By ignoring two decades of post-Quinlan jurisprudence (state
supreme court cases that explicitly hold that treatment refusals
are neither suicide nor homicide), failing to make such basic
distinctions as those between the right to refuse treatment and
the "right to die" slogan, between abortion and suicide, between
suicide and assisted suicide, and between discrimination and
good medical care, these courts virtually guarantee that their
decisions will not be the last word on the subject. Since states
have a compelling interest in protecting all citizens, especially
terminally ill and vulnerable citizens, it seems likely that the
U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately uphold state laws that
criminalize assisted suicide. The Court is also likely to permit
states to decriminalize physician-assisted suicide if they so wish.
There are real problems with how patients die in America
under a physician's care. The SUPPORT study, for example,
found that the families of 50% of their sample of patients who
died in the hospital believed that the patients "experienced mod-
erate or severe pain at least half the time during their last 3
days of life."37
The marvel is not that a small group of patients ask for
physician-prescribed medications to end their lives-it is that
more don't make this request. Physician prescriptions for lethal
medication should remain a limited legal option as it has always
been under the admittedly over-romanticized "Quill model;" but
we should all work hard to make actual use of these drugs by
patients a last resort rather than a first resort. This will re-
quire universal health care coverage, including hospice care,
adequate pain control, and psychological support at the end of
life. It is one of the great paradoxes of contemporary America
that we have spent more time on the right to refuse treatment
than the right to obtain treatment in the past two decades, and
that we currently would rather give patients the "right to die"
than medical care to help them live.
37. SUPPORT, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospital-
ized Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
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